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VACCINATION EXEMPTIONS IN STATE SCHOOLS
When a person's religious beliefs forbid his complying with the
public health laws of a state, serious legal questions always arise.1 It
has long been considered a proper exercise of state police power to
require smallpox vaccinations of students as a condition precedent to
their right to enroll in public schools. 2
Although the vaccination renders the person vaccinated immune
to smallpox, 3 he still may be a carrier of the disease.4 Consequently,
1If the law is enforced, does this violate the rights of free exercise and estab-
lishment of religion contained in the first amendment of the Federal Constitution
and made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment? Does it
violate the guarantee of equal protection of the laws? Does it violate the right
of liberty?
Is a person's secular loyalty and subjection to state law more important than his
loyalty to his religious principles and beliefs, and does a state have the right and
power to so dictate? Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), denied the right of
children to distribute religious material after dark, in order to protect them from
harm, and Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948), denied any right to
handle poisonous snakes as a part of a religious ceremony.
'Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (19o5); People ex rel. Barmore v. Rob-
ertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922); Ex parte Lewis, 328 Mo. 843, 42 S.W.2d 21
(1931); Board of Education v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d 394 (1959).
2Schmidt, Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine 858 (1962).
There is considerable dispute as to the effect of the smallpox vaccination and
as to whether it actually results in absolute immunity. However, in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. at 35, the court stated that whether or not the vaccination
is medically sound, judicial notice would be taken of the proposition that it does
achieve absolute immunity since the public is under this impression. This propo-
sition is stated as fact in this comment since the courts treat it as such.
4There are no other valid reasons for the requirement. The unvaccinated student
cannot spread smallpox to vaccinated students since they are immune.
Immunity by vaccination is obtained by introducing a germ into an individual
so that his system can build up resistance to the germs so introduced. Schmidt, At-
torney's Dictionary of Medicine 391 (1962). The theory that a vaccination prevents
the spreading of disease to unvaccinated persons, therefore, is exposed as fallacious.
Unless the entire world is vaccinated, the vaccinated person is the one most likely to
spread the disease to unvaccinated persons.
Vaccination is not the only way a person may obtain immunity from a dis-
ease such as smallpox. People obtain a certain degree of immunity, known as herd
immunity, by association and membership in a group. Burrows, Textbook of Micro-
biology 291 (17th ed. 1959). Natural immunity from a disease may be obtained by
normal daily contact with germs so that resistance may be built up. Schmidt, supra
at 391. A child may inherit immunity from his mother. Schmidt, supra at 391.
There is an objection on medical grounds to denying an unvaccinated student
the right to enroll in public schools. An unvaccinated student has a better chance
of obtaining herd or natural immunity by association in a school group which
has a very high incidence of vaccination.
Smallpox occurs in two forms. Malignant smallpox, known as variola major,
is considered the most serious and has been the cause of death in 25% to 40% of
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the purpose of the vaccination requirement is limited to the public's
interest in preserving a life that is an asset to society, and does not
extend to the prevention or spread of the disease. This purpose ex-
ceeds in importance the right to free exercise of religion. 5 It has been
held, therefore, that a student does not have a constitutional right
to an exemption.7 The only exceptions to the vaccination require-
ment have been those provided by the legislatures or granted by
authorities empowered with discretion to grant exemptions.8
The interesting question of whether there may be a constitutional
right to an exemption from the vaccination requirement was con-
sidered in the recent case of Kolbeck v. Kramer.9 Kolbeck applied to
and was accepted by Rutgers University for the September 1962 term.
While registering in the university, Kolbeck refused to submit to a
smallpox vaccination, claiming that it was contrary to his religious
principles and beliefs. The university then supplied Kolbeck with an
exemption form which required certification that the applicant for
exemption was a member of the Christian Science religion. Kolbeck
the reported cases. Variola minor, the milder form of smallpox, has a fatality rate
of i% of the reported cases. In the United States variola major is now almost extinct,
having been replaced by variola minor. Variola major, which is distinguished from
variola minor in that it exists in epidemic form, is prevalent in Asia, Africa and
the Middle East. Burrows, supra at 814.
Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172, 188 N.E. 677 (1934); Mosier v. Barren County
Bd. of Health, 3o8 Ky. 829, 215 S.W.2d 967 (1948); Sadlock v. Board of Educ., 137
N.J.L. 85, 58 A.2d 218 (1948); Streich v. Board of Educ., 34 S.D. 169, 147 N.V.
779 (1914); McSween v. Board of School Trustees, 6o Tex. Civ. App. 270, 129 S.W.
206 (191o); City of New Braunfels v. Waldschmidt, io9 Tex. 302, 207 S.W. 303
(1918); Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964).
OAny general reference to the Constitution in this comment covers both the
Federal Constitution and applicable state constitutions.
7E.g., Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 14-30-110 (Supp. 1964), where an exemption is
granted to religious objectors; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-204 (igo6), where an ex-
emption is granted to students whose physical condition makes vaccination un-
wise, hereinafter referred to as unfit subjects; Ga. Code Ann. § 32-911 (Supp. 1963),
where exemptions are granted to religious objectors and to unfit subjects; Mass.
Ann. Laws, ch. iii, § 183 (1964), where an exemption is granted to unfit subjects;
Miss. Code Ann. § 6328-24(9) (Supp. 1962), where exemptions are granted to
religious objectors and to unfit subjects; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:14-52 (Supp. 1963),
where exemptions are granted to unfit subjects and local boards are given the
power to exempt religious objectors; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-3-4.3 (Supp. 1963), where
a student is exempted upon his showing that he is an unfit subject, "or upon affi-
davits from an officer of a recognized religious denomination that such child's
parents or guardians are bona fide members of a denomination whose religious
teaching requires reliance upon prayer or spiritual means alone for healing."
(Emphasis added.) The constitutionality of the New Mexico statute has not been
tested, and it is possible that no one has standing to attack it.
084 N.J. Super. 569, 202 A.2d 889 (1964).
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was not a Christian Scientist and did not belong to a recognized relig-
ious sect. Rutgers denied Kolbeck the exemption, contending that his
claim was not based on a bona fide religious belief. At this time, there
were enrolled in the university eight Christian Science students who
were exempted from the vaccination requirement due to their religious
beliefs.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, in ordering the defendant
university to admit Kolbeck,' 0 said, "The State or any instrumentality
thereof cannot, under any circumstances, show a preference of one re-
ligion over another. Such favoritism cannot be tolerated and must be
disapproved as a clear violation of the Bills of Rights of our Constitu-
tions." 1
The court reasoned that since Rutgers is a governmental agency
of New Jersey,12 it is subject to the rulings of the State Board of Ed-
10This was an action brought in lieu of a prerogative writ by Kolbeck through
his father as guardian ad litem.
The court did not explicitly discuss Kolbeck's standing to attack constitution-
ality, but recognized it implicitly.
Kolbeck has standing since the action arises out of a case or controversy and he
has shown that the challenged action is unconstitutional as applied to him. See
the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com-
mittee v. McGrath, 3.1 U.S. 123, 149 (1951). Kolbeck has directly suffered a detri-
ment due to the challenged act and stands to benefit by it being declared un-
constitutional.
If Kolbeck were attacking the New Mexico statute, supra note 8, granting ex-
emptions to members of specific sects, he would not have standing; if the act were
declared unconstitutional, he would not gain a benefit since the statute would be
rendered invalid and would thus serve only to destroy the existing exemption
and not create a new one for his benefit.
In this case, however, Kolbeck is attacking the constitutionality of Rutgers
University's act denying him admission. If this act is found to be unconstitutional,
it is invalidated and Rutgers must admit Kolbeck. Thus, Kolbeck stands to benefit
from a finding of unconstitutionality.
Under the New Jersey statute, supra note 8, Rutgers had the power to grant
exemptions to religious objectors or could, if it so desired, deny them admission.
Rutgers chose to grant the exemption to Christian Scientists. It then denied Kol-
beck admission because he was not a Christian Scientist. Kolbeck is not attacking
the university's act in granting the exemption to Christian Scientists, but its act
denying him admission. Once the university exerted its discretion to grant an ex-
emption to religious objectors, it could not constitutionally withhold the exemp-
tion from non-Christian Scientists.
Three acts are involved: (i) the act of the New Jersey legislature granting
Rutgers the power to exempt religious objectors; (2) the act of Rutgers granting
this exemption to Christian Scientists; (3) the act of Rutgers denying this exemption
to Kolbeck since he was not a Christian Scientist. To complain of the first and
second acts, Kolbeck does not have standing. To complain of the third act, he
does.
202 A.2d at 893.
12N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:22-15.1 (Supp. 1963).
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ucation13 whose powers are provided by statute.' 4 Thus, the univer-
sity's power is indirectly controlled by the New Jersey statute. While
the statute concerning vaccination provides for the exclusion from
schools of unvaccinated students, it gives the Board of Education a
discretionary power to exempt students who have religious objec-
tions.15
The court stated that Rutgers University could properly exert its
discretion to grant or deny exemptions to all religious objectors;' 0
but Rutgers could not grant exemptions to persons professing one
religious belief, as the Christian Scientists, and simultaneously deny
an exemption to the plaintiff, who had a different, but equally bona
fide religious belief.
7
The court expressly stated that the right of liberty as found in the
first and fourteenth amendments was violated,'8 since the university,
by denying admission to Kolbeck, was restricting his right to matricu-
late by discriminating against his religious beliefs.' 9 The university
could not classify Kolbeck's individual belief as non-religious merely
because he was not a member of a recognized religious sect.
Equal protection of the laws was denied Kolbeck when the uni-
versity arbitrarily classified him as not being exempt under the New
Jersey statute, which classification was contrary to the classification
of another religious faith as being so exempt.
2 0
1N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:22-15.57 (Supp. 1963).
11N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:2-4(b) (Supp. 1963).
',"A board of education may exclude from school any teacher or pupil who has
not been successfully vaccinated or revaccinated, unless the teacher or pupil shall
present a certificate signed by the medical inspector appointed by the board of
education that the teacher or pupil is an unfit subject for vaccination, but the
board of education may exempt a teacher or pupil from the provisions of this
section, if said teacher or the parent or guardian of said pupil objects thereto in
a written statement signed by him upon the ground that the proposed vaccination
interferes with the free exercise of his religious principles." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:14-
52 (Supp. 1963).
It should be noted that the exemption of an unfit subject appears to be man.
datory under this statute.
10202 A.2d at 89o.
171d. at 893.
8"There is no right in a state or an instrumentality thereof to determine that
a cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the means of de-
termining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amend-
ment and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 202 A.2d at 892.
"'This limits the free exercise of religion provided for by the first amendment.
It is made applicable to the states and individuals in the guarantee of liberty in
the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 31o U.S. 296 (1940).
""The suggestion that plaintiff does not have a bona fide religion to qualify
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Somewhat surprisingly, the vaccination cases have not shown any
historical development. 21 The principles developed in the very first
cases are the same principles employed in recent cases.
for this exemption ... indicates an arbitrary and capricious policy for a State
University." 202 A.2d at 893.
An equal protection of the laws violation is usually indicated by the court's
finding that a state or instrumentality thereof indulges in an arbitrary classification
detrimental to one group of persons. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.
6f (i911).
"1The conscientious objector cases concern the same legal principles as does the
principal case. The historical development of these cases helps illuminate the con-
stitutional questions raised. It must be kept in mind, however, that the conscien-
tious objector cases are not based upon public health policy.
There are no constitutional grounds by which the conscientious objector can re-
fuse to submit to military service under religious objections. Checinski v. United
States, 129 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1942). The first exemptions came through legislative
grants by the states. E.g., State v. Roberts, 1 Me. 369 (1820), where a state constitution
granting an exemption was construed as being a delegation to the legislature to
control the matter of exemptions. These early grants usually enumerated specific
religious sects, members of which were to be exempted upon a religious claim sup-
ported by required affidavits. E.g., Me. Stat. (1821) C. 164, § 1 [Rev. Stat. (1940) c. 16,
§ 3]. Cases arising under these early statutes held that constitutional rights were not
violated by enforcing these statutes. E.g., State v. Roberts, supra. In 193o, Macintosh
v. United States, 42 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1930), suggested that in order for one to
qualify for the exemption it was not essential to be a member of a specific religious
sect.
In 1940, Congress passed a Selective Service Act which allowed exemptions to
conscientious objectors who objected to military service on religious grounds. Se-
lective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 5.
The Universal Military Training and Service Act contains the same provision,
but in § 4560) states: "Religious training and belief in this connection means an
individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views or merely personal moral code." 6a Stat.
604 (1948). 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 456 at io2 (Supp. 1963).
Limiting the exemption to those who believe in a Supreme Being was de-
clared unconstitutional and a violation of due process in 1964. United States v.
Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 922 (1964).
In determining the right to an exemption, the courts have looked, not to the
religion under which the claimant professes membership, but to the sincerity of his
objection. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955); Peter v. United States, 324
F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1963); Annot., 99 L. Ed. 443, 447. Thus, a member of a religious
sect, recognized to have military objections, may be denied an exemption if the
court feels that he, as an individual, is not sincere in his objections on religious
grounds. Bradley v. United States, 218 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1954); United States
v. Simmons, 213 F.2d 9o (7th Cir. 1954); Gonzales v. United States, 212 F.2d 71
(6th Cir. 1954). A person who is not a member of a specific religious sect may be
allowed the exemption. Williams v. United States, 216 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1954);
United States v. Hein, 112 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1953) (dictum).
Such administration of the military requirement does not run the risk of deny-
ing the constitutional rights of due process and equal protection of the laws since
it avoids group association and treats each individual as a separate entity. Likewise,
it does not run the risk of denying the claimant liberty since it is not deciding
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All states have the power to enforce the vaccination requirement. 22
They differ, however, as to how the power is exercised. Three different
methods are utilized: (i) a statute making the vaccination a mandatory
requirement, 23 (2) a statute giving administrative bodies the power
to require the vaccination,24 or (3) administrative enforcement in the
absence of a specific statute, but implied under a general grant to
make rules regarding public health.
25
The first method precludes any discretionary action on the part of
whether a cause is religious, but rather, whether the claimant sincerely entertains
such a belief.
Up until now, the vaccination cases were in the same stage of development
as the conscientious objector cases were prior to 1930. The Kolbeck case appears
to be a step towards the same type of development as the Macintosh case indicated.
This lag is probably due to the fact that it is far more popular to seek exemption
from military service than to seek exemption from a vaccination requirement.
Whether the development in the military cases will be followed in the vaccination
cases is yet to be seen.
2rE.g., Ala. Code tit. 37, § 493 (Recomp. 1958); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §
14-30-090 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-629 (1956); Cal. Educ. Code § 11851;
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § io-2o4 (196o); D.C. Code Ann. § 31-11o2 (1961); Ga. Code
Ann. § 32-911 (Supp. 1963); Md. Ann. Code art. 77, § 133 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 76, § 15 (1964); Miss. Code Ann. § 6328-24(9) (Supp. 1962);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 163.017 (Supp. 1963); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 2oo:1 (1955); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 18:14-52 (Supp. 1963); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12-3-4.1 (Supp. 1963); N.Y.
Pub. Health Law § 213o; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130-87 (repl. vol. 1964); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3313.67 (Baldwin 1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1303 (1962); S.C. Code
§ 32-694 (1962); Va. Code Ann. § 22-249 (repl. vol. 1964); W. Va. Code Ann.
§ 1285 (1961); Wis. Stat. § 143.13 (1963).
In the absence of a statute, by a general grant to states or their instrumentalities,
they have this power whether or not they exert it. Infra note 25.
2D.C. Code Ann. § 31-1102 (1961); Md. Ann. Code art. 77, § 133 (1957); Mass.
Ann. Laws ch. 76, § 15 (1964); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 200:1 (1955); N.Y. Pub. Health
Law § 213o; N.C. Gen. Stat. §130-87 (repl. vol. 1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 13-1303
(1962); S.C. Code § 32-694 (1962); Va. Code Ann. § 22-249 (repl. vol. 1964); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 1285 (1961).
A state statute may give local authorities the power to make the vaccination
compulsory by passing appropriate ordinances; then, by exercising this power the
regulation becomes mandatory. Ala. Code tit. 37, § 493 (recomp. 1958).
2AAlaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 14-30-090 (1962); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-204
(196o); Ga. Code Ann. § 32-911 (Supp. 1963); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18:14-52 (Supp.
1963); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.67 (Baldwin 1964).
25The following states lack specific vaccination statutes, but have the power
to enforce the requirement under a general grant to provide for public health regu-
lations: Arizona; Arkansas; California; Delaware; Florida; Hawaii; Illinois
Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Michigan; Minnesota; Nebraska;
Nevada; Rhode Island; Tennessee; Texas; Vermont; Washington.
See the Texas case of Chrestman v. Tompkins, 5 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928), for an application of this power.
There is an Arizona statute that explicitly prohibits compulsory vaccination.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-629 (1956).
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local boards of education. Any provision for exemption in one of these
statutes also serves as a mandate upon local boards. A student, there-
fore, cannot make a plea for an exemption not explicitly included
within the statute.
2 6
By the nature of the second method, a vaccination requirement
can be enforced as compulsory or can be entirely disregarded. If en-
forced, the granting of exemptions may be discretionary.27 If discre-
tionary, the local boards can deny admittance to a student who could
have been exempted by an express statutory grant.28 They can also
allow admittance to a student who might not have been exempted un-
der a mandatory interpretation of the statute.29 This type of statute,
therefore, contains the possibility of both more lenient and stricter en-
forcement of exemptions than the first method.3 0
The third method is usually enforced during a period of smallpox
epidemic,3 ' and local boards of education enforce the vaccination re-
quirement as a protective health measure. Such power is upheld and
is not subject to exemption.3 2
In upholding the power to exclude unvaccinated students from
public schools, the courts have found that such an exclusion does
not violate the constitutional rights of due process,
3 3 civil liberty,34
or religious freedom.3 5 It has been generally held that the exclusion
does not conflict with the right to attend school36 or with compulsory
education requirements. 37
Once it becomes established that religious beliefs are sufficient
grounds for exemptions from the vaccination requirements, it remains
OSee supra note 7.
'Supra note 15, where the exemptions for religious objectors is discretionary
and the exemption for unfit subjects is mandatory.
-Board of Educ. v. Maas, supra note 2.
2'Ibid.
OIt can be more lenient since the entire provision can be disregarded by a local
board. It can be stricter since the provision for exemption can be disregarded.
3'Auten v. Board of Directors, 83 Ark. 431, 104 SA. 130 (1907); Vonnegut
v. Baun, supra note 5; Duffield v. School Dist., 162 Pa. 476, 29 At. 742 (1894);
State ex rel. Cox v. Board of Educ., 21 Utah 401, 60 Pac. 1013 (0oo).
mIbid.




mHagler v. Lamer, 248 Ill. 547, 12o N.E. 575 (1918); Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121,
56 N.E. 89 (igoo).
Contra, Osborn v. Russell, 64 Kan. 507, 68 Pac. 60 (1902).
mHartman v. May, 168 Miss. 477, 151 So. 737 (1934).
19651
